Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute m goods to n agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general valuations.
Introduction
Fair division of goods among competing agents is a fundamental problem in Economics and Computer Science. There is a set M of m goods and the goal is to allocate goods among n agents in a fair way. An allocation is a partition of M into disjoint subsets X 1 , . . . , X n where X i is the set of goods given to agent i. When can an allocation be considered "fair"? One of the most well-studied notions of fairness is Envy-freeness. Every agent has a value associated with each subset of M and agent i envies agent j if i values X j more than X i . An allocation is envy-free if no agent envies another. An envy-free allocation can be regarded as a fair and desirable partition of M among the n agents since no agent envies another; as mentioned in [26] , such a mechanism of partitioning land dates back to the Bible.
Unlike land which is divisible, goods in our setting are indivisible and an envy-free allocation of the given set of goods need not exist. Consider the following simple example with two agents and a single good: one of the agents has to receive this good and the other agent envies her. Since envy-free allocations need not exist, several relaxations have been considered.
Relaxations. Budish [11] introduced the notion of EF1: this is an allocation of goods that is "envy-free up to one good". In an EF1 allocation, agent i may envy agent j, however this envy would vanish as soon as some good is removed from X j . Note that no good is really removed from X j : this is simply a way of assessing how much i values X j more than X i . That is, if i values X j more than X i , then there exists some g ∈ X j such that i values X i at least as much as X j \ {g}. Going back to the example of two agents and a single good, the allocation where one agent receives this good is EF1. It is known that EF1 allocations always exist; as shown by Lipton et al. [25] , such an allocation can be efficiently computed.
Caragiannis et al. [13] introduced a notion of envy-freeness called EFX that is stronger than EF1. An EFX allocation is one that is "envy-free up to any good". In an EFX allocation, agent i may envy agent j, however this envy would vanish as soon as any good is removed from X j . Thus every EFX allocation is also EF1 but not every EF1 allocation is EFX. Consider this simple example: there are three goods a, b, c and two agents with additive valuations (defined in Section 1.1) as described below. Both agents value c twice as much as a or b. The allocation where agent 1 gets {a} and agent 2 gets {b, c} is EF1 but not EFX. On the other hand, the allocation where agent 1 gets {a, b} and agent 2 gets {c} is EFX. Indeed, the latter allocation seems fairer than the former allocation. As said in [12] : "Arguably, EFX is the best fairness analog of envy-freeness of indivisible items". While it is known that EF1 allocations always exist, the question of whether EFX allocations always exist is still an open problem (despite significant effort, as per [13] ).
Plaut and Roughgarden [26] showed that EFX allocations always exist (i) when there are only two agents or (ii) when all n agents have the same valuations. Moreover, it was shown in [26] that exponentially many value queries may be needed to determine EFX allocations even in the restricted setting where there are only two agents with identical submodular valuation functions 1 . It is not known if an EFX allocation always exists even when there are only three agents with additive valuations. It was remarked in [26] : "We suspect that at least for general valuations, there exist instances where no EFX allocation exists".
Our Results
Let N = [n] be the set of agents. Every agent i ∈ [n] has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R ≥0 , where M is the set of m goods. We show our main existence result for general valuation functions, i.e., the only assumptions we make on any valuation function v i is that (i) it is normalized, i.e., v i (∅) = 0, and (ii) it is monotone, i.e., S ⊆ T implies v i (S) ≤ v i (T ). In contrast, the EFX-with-charity allocation in [12] works only for additive valuations, i.e., v i (S) = g∈S v i ({g}). We show there always exists an allocation 3 X = X 1 , . . . , X n that satisfies the following properties:
1. X is EFX, i.e., for any two agents i, j:
X i is the set of unallocated goods;
3. |P | < n (recall that n is the number of agents).
Our proof is constructive. We start with no goods being allocated to the agents and find the claimed allocation by at most nmV /∆ applications of three simple update rules. Here, n is the number of agents, m is the number of goods, V = max i v i (M ) is the maximum valuation of any agent, and ∆ = min i min{|v i (T ) − v i (S)| : S, T ⊆ M and v i (S) = v i (T )} is the minimum difference between distinct valuations. The update rules use a minimum-size-valuable-set-oracle: Given S ⊆ M , agent i, and α ∈ R such that v i (S) > α, find a minimum cardinality subset Z ⊆ S such that v i (Z) > α. If this oracle can be realized by an algorithm, our proof is algorithmic.
It also follows from our proof that when all agents have the same valuation function, our allocation is complete. That is, |P | = 0. This is an alternate proof to the existence of complete EFX allocations for identical (general) valuations, originally shown in [26] .
2 This is an allocation that maximizes Π n i=1 vi(X * i ), where vi is agent i's valuation function. 3 Henceforth, allocations are partial and we will use "complete allocation" to refer to one where all goods are allocated.
Our next result is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to find an allocation that obeys properties 1-3 given above. For this, we assume that all agents have gross substitute valuations (defined in Section 3). For gross substitute valuations, the minimum-size-valuable-set-oracle can be realized by a simple greedy algorithm. Every additive valuation is a gross substitute valuation and gross substitute valuations form a subclass of the set of submodular valuations [22] .
• Suppose all agents have gross substitute valuations. Then an EFX allocation with properties 1-3 can be computed with poly(n, m, V, 1/∆) queries.
Additive valuations
The most well-understood class of valuation functions is the set of additive valuations. We consider the case when all agents have additive valuations and show that our allocation or very minor variants of our allocation can guarantee several other notions of fairness.
Ensuring high Nash social welfare. We show that modifying the starting step of our algorithm ensures that our allocation X, which satisfies properties 1-3 stated above, also has a high Nash social welfare. That is, [12] , where X * = X * 1 , . . . , X * n is an optimal Nash social welfare allocation.
Number of Unallocated Goods and MMS Guarantee. Another interesting and wellstudied notion of fairness is maximin share. Suppose agent i has to partition M into n bundles (or sets) knowing that she would receive the worst bundle with respect to her valuation. Then i will choose a partition of M that maximizes the valuation of the worst bundle (wrt her valuation). The value of this worst bundle is the maximin share of agent i. An important question here is: does there always exist an allocation of M where every agent gets a bundle worth at least her maximin share? Formally, let N and M be the sets of n agents and m goods, respectively. We define the maximin share of an agent i as follows: (here X is the set of all complete allocations)
The goal is to determine an allocation X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n of M such that for every i we have v i (X i ) ≥ MMS i (n, M ). This question was first posed by Budish [11] . Procaccia and Wang [27] showed that such an allocation need not exist, even in the restricted setting of only three agents! Thereafter, approximate-MMS allocations were studied [27, 18, 20, 19] and we know polynomial time algorithms to find allocations where for all i, agent i gets a bundle of value at least α · MMS i (n, M ); the current best guarantee for α is 3/4 − by Ghodsi et al. [20] (for any > 0) and this was very recently improved to 3/4 by Garg and Taki [19] .
Amanatadis et al. [2] showed that any complete EFX allocation is also a 4 7 -MMS allocation. We show that our allocation promises better MMS guarantees when the number of unallocated goods is large. Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n be our allocation as described by properties 1-3 above and let P be the set of unallocated goods. For any agent i ∈ [n], we have:
Hence, the larger the number of unallocated goods, the better guarantees we get on MMS. The extreme values are |P | = 0 and |P | = n − 1. When |P | = 0, we have a complete EFX allocation and when |P | = n − 1, we have an EFX allocation that is an almost-MMS allocation:
Improved Guarantees for Groupwise MMS. Barman et al. [6] recently introduced a notion of fairness called groupwise maximin share (GMMS) which is stronger than MMS. An allocation is said to be GMMS if the MMS condition is satisfied for every subgroup of agents and the union of the sets of goods allocated to them. Formally, a complete allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n is α-GMMS if for any N ⊆ N , we have v i (X i ) ≥ α · MMS i (n , i∈N X i ) where n = |N |. Every GMMS allocation, i.e. α = 1, is also a complete EFX allocation [6] .
It is known [6] that there are instances where GMMS is arbitrarily better than MMS. Naturally, it is a harder problem to approximate GMMS than MMS. While 3 4 -MMS allocations always exist, the largest α for which α-GMMS allocations are known to exist is 1 2 [6] . We extend the result of Amanatadis et al. [2] for MMS to show the following:
• A 4 7 -GMMS allocation always exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time.
In particular, we show that modifying the last step of our algorithm results in a complete allocation that is 
Our Techniques
Envy-Graph. We now give an overview of the main ideas used to find our EFX allocation. We first recall the algorithm of Lipton et al. [25] for finding an EF1 allocation 4 . They use the notion of an envy-graph: here each vertex corresponds to an agent and there is an edge (i, j) iff i envies j. The invariant maintained is that the envy-graph is a DAG: a cycle corresponds to a cycle of envy and by swapping bundles along a cycle, every agent becomes better-off and the number of envy edges decreases. More precisely, if i 0 → i 1 → i 2 → . . . → i −1 → i 0 is a cycle in the envy graph, then reassigning X i j+1 to agent i j for 0 ≤ j < (indices are to be read modulo ) will increase the valuation of every agent in the cycle. Also if there was an edge s to some i k where s is not a part of the cycle, this edge just gets directed now from s to i k+1 after we exchange bundles along the cycle. Thus the number of envy edges in the graph does not increase and the valuations of the agents in the cycle goes up. Thus cycles can be eliminated.
The algorithm in [25] runs in rounds and always maintains an allocation that is also EF1. At the beginning of every round, an unenvied agent s (this is a source vertex in this DAG) is identified and an unallocated good g is allocated to s. The new allocation is also EF1, as nobody will envy the bundle of s after removing the good g.
The Cut-and-Merge Operation. We now highlight a key difference between an EF1 allocation and an EFX allocation. From the algorithm of Lipton et al. [25] , it is clear that given an EF1 allocation on a set M 0 of goods, one can determine an EF1 allocation on M 0 ∪ M 1 , for any M 1 ⊆ M \ M 0 , by simply adding goods from M 1 one-by-one to the existing bundles and changing the owners (if necessary) in a clever way. Intuitively, we never need to cut or merge the bundles formed in any EF1 allocation. We can just append the unallocated goods appropriately to the current bundles.
The above strategy is very far from true for EFX. Consider the example illustrated below with three agents with additive valuations and four goods a, b, c, and d. An EFX allocation for the first three goods has to give exactly one of a, b, c to each of the three agents. However an EFX allocation for all the four goods has to allocate the singleton set {d} to some agent (say, agent 1) and say, {a} to agent 2 and {b, c} to agent 3. Thus the allocation needs to cut and merged. When there are many agents -each with her own valuation, figuring out the cut-and-merge operations is the difficult step. Here we implement a "merge-and-cut" operation as follows.
Improving Social Welfare. Suppose we have an EFX allocation X = X 1 , . . . , X n on some subset M 0 ⊂ M . We would now like to add a good g ∈ M \ M 0 . However we will not be able to guarantee an EFX allocation on M 0 ∪ {g}. What we will ensure is that either case (i) or case (ii) occurs:
for all i and for at least one agent j we have
; in other words, social welfare strictly improves.
(ii) We have an EFX allocation on M 0 ∪ {g} and the social welfare remains unchanged.
Hence in each step of our algorithm, we either increase the number of allocated goods or we increase social welfare-thus we always make progress. This is similar to the approach used by Plaut and Roughgarden [26] to guarantee the existence of 1 2 -EFX 5 when agents have subadditive valuations. We now outline how we ensure one of case (i), case (ii) has to happen:
For simplicity of exposition, we assume the envy-graph corresponding to our starting EFX allocation X has a single source s. Add g to s's bundle: if nobody envies s up to any good then we are in an easy case as we have an EFX allocation on M 0 ∪ {g}. In this case, we "decycle" the envy-graph (if cycles are created) and continue. Observe that swapping bundles along a cycle in the envy-graph increases social welfare.
Most Envious Agent. So assume there are one or more agents who envy s up to any good after g is allocated to s. To resolve this, we introduce the concept of a most envious agent. Let i be an agent who envies s up to any good, so v i (X i ) < v i (S ) for some S ⊂ X s ∪ {g}. Let S i be the subset of X s ∪ {g} with the minimum cardinality such that
The agent i with the smallest value of |S i | (break ties arbitrarily) is the most envious agent of s. Call this agent t.
The crucial observation is that no agent envies S t up to any good-otherwise it would contradict t being the agent with the smallest value of |S t |. Recall the assumption that s is the only source, so there is a path s → i 1 → · · · → i k−1 → t in the envy-graph. We do a leftwise shift of bundles along this path: so s gets i 1 's bundle, and for 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1: i r gets i r+1 's bundle (where i k = t), and finally t gets S t . The goods in X s ∪ {g} \ S t are thrown back into the pool of unallocated goods.
Observe that every agent in this path is strictly better-off now than in the allocation X and nobody is worse-off. Moreover, by the definition of S t , there are no agents envying any agent up to any good. Thus we have a desired EFX allocation X . When there are multiple sources, we can adapt this technique provided there are enough unallocated goods; in particular, the number of unallocated goods must be at least the number of sources in the envy-graph. We describe this in detail in Section 2.
We would like to contrast the above approach with other EFX algorithms [26, 12] . The 1 2 -EFX algorithm by Plaut and Roughgarden [26] either merges g (the new good) with an existing bundle or allocates the singleton set {g} to an agent while the EFX-with-charity algorithm by Caragiannis et al. [12] takes an allocation of maximum Nash social welfare as input and then permanently removes some goods from the instance. We regard the notion of "most envious 5 An allocation X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is agent" that shows a natural way of breaking up a bundle to preserve envy-freeness up to any good as one of the innovative contributions of our work.
Our Other Results. Regarding our result with approximate MMS guarantee, the larger the number of unallocated goods in our EFX allocation, the larger are the number of sources: these are unenvied agents. Moreover, no agent envies the set of unallocated goods. Suppose for now that |P | = n − 1. This means every agent is a source. So no agent envies the bundle of any other agent and also the set of unallocated goods. Thus for each agent i, we have:
where the constraint that v i (M )/n ≥ MMS i (n, M ) holds for additive valuations. We show our result for approximate-MMS allocation and our improved bound for approximate-GMMS allocation in Section 4.
Related Work
Fair division of divisible resources is a classical and well-studied subject starting from 1940's [28] . Fair division of indivisible goods among competing agents is a young and exciting topic with recent work on EF1 and EFX allocations [13, 8, 26, 9, 12] , approximate maximin share allocations [11, 10, 3, 7, 23, 20, 18] , and approximation algorithms for maximizing Nash social welfare and generalizations [16, 15, 14, 4, 17, 5] . As mentioned earlier, Caragiannis et al. [13] introduced the notion of EFX: whether such allocations always exist is an enigmatic open problem. It was shown in [13] that there always exists an EF1 allocation that is also Pareto-optimal 6 and Barman et al. in [8] showed a weakly-polynomial time algorithm to compute such an allocation.
Applications. Fair division of goods or resources occurs in many real-world scenarios and this is demonstrated by the popularity of the website Spliddit (http://www.spliddit.org) that implements mechanisms for fair division where users can log in, define what needs to be divided, and enter their valuations. This website guarantees an EF1 allocation that is also Pareto-optimal and since its launch in 2014, it has been used tens of thousands of times [13] . We refer to [21, 26] for details on the diverse applications for which Spliddit has been used: these range from rent division and taxi fare division to credit assignment for an academic paper or group project. Another such website is Fair Outcomes, Inc. (http://www.fairoutcomes.com). Another interesting application is Course Allocate used at Wharton School that guarantees certain fairness properties to allocate courses among students [26] .
Existence of an EFX-Allocation with Bounded Charity
We prove our main result on EFX-with-bounded-charity allocations in this section. We will define three update rules. Each update rule takes a pair (X, P ) consisting of an allocation X and a set P of unallocated goods (we will call P the pool) and returns a modified pair (X , P ). Each application of an update rule will ensure that either (i) the social welfare φ(X) = i∈[n] v i (X i ) of the current allocation increases or (ii) the size of the pool decreases and the social welfare is left unchanged, so |P | < |P | in this case. Hence the update process will terminate. The overall structure of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
In order to define our update rules, we need the concepts of envy-graph and the most envious agent for a bundle of goods. These were discussed in Section 1.2 and we formally define them below.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Computing an EFX-Allocation
Postcondition: X is EFX, |P | < n and
while one of the update rules shown in Algorithm 2 is applicable do Invariant: X is EFX and the envy-graph G X is acyclic
3:
Let U be an applicable update rule;
4:
(X, P ) ← U (X, P );
5:
Decycle the envy-graph; 6: end while Definition 1. The envy-graph G X for an allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n has the set of agents as vertices and there is a directed edge from agent i to agent j if and only if
The notion of envy-graph was introduced in [25] and it is well-known that cycles can be removed from the envy-graph without destroying desirable properties (see Lemma 2). Thus we can maintain G X as a DAG. For an agent s, the reachability component C(s) consists all agents reachable from s in the envy-graph. The sources in the envy-graph are the vertices with indegree zero.
For ease of notation, we will use B \ g and B ∪ g to denote B \ {g} and B ∪ {g}, respectively.
Proof. Consider any agent i. We have
Since X is just a permutation of X, for any agent j there exists some agent j such that X j = X j . Therefore, since X is EFX, for any good g ∈ X j (or equivalently X j ) we have 
The following definition formalizes the notion of "most envious agents". Let S ⊆ M , then we define
If there is no i with v i (S) > v i (X i ), then A X (S) is empty. We make a simple observation.
Lemma 4. Consider an agent i ∈ A X (S) and let Z ⊆ S be such that |Z| = κ X (S) and
Proof. Let j be any agent. There are two cases:
In the former case, we have v j (X j ) ≥ v j (Z \ g) by monotonicity. In the latter case, v j (X j ) ≥ v j (Z ) for all sets Z ⊆ S of size at most κ X (j, S) − 1 (by definition of κ X (j, S)). Note that the set
We are now ready to present our three update rules U 0 , U 1 , and U 2 , see Algorithm 2.
Rule U 0 : Rule U 0 is the easiest of the update rules. It is applicable whenever adding a good from the pool to some source of G X does not destroy the EFX-property (see Algorithm 2).
Lemma 5 (Rule U 0 ).
Algorithm 2 The Update Rules
There is a good g ∈ P and an agent i such that allocating g to i results in an EFX allocation.
2:
Allocate g to i, i.e., X i ← X i ∪ g, P ← P \ g, and X j = X j for j = i.
3:
return (X , P ). 4: end function 5: function U 1 (allocation X, pool P ) Precondition: There is an agent i such that v i (P ) > v i (X i ).
6:
Let i be an agent in A X (P ) and let Z ⊆ P be a set of size κ X (P ) such that v i (Z) > v i (X i ).
7:
Set X i = Z and X j = X j for j = i.
8:
Set P = X i ∪ (P \ Z).
9:
return (X , P ). 10: end function 11: function U 2 (allocation X, pool P ) Precondition: There is an ≥ 1, distinct goods g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g −1 in P , distinct sources s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s −1 of G X and distinct agents t 1 , t 2 ,. . . , t such that t i ∈ C(s i ) ∩ A X (X s i−1 ∪ g i−1 ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ − 1 (indices are to be interpreted modulo ).
12:
13:
14:
for all k ∈ {0, . . . , m i − 1} and all i ∈ {0, . . . , − 1}.
16:
Set X t i = Z i−1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , }.
17:
Set X j = X j for all other j.
18:
return (X , P ). 19: end function a) Rule U 0 returns an EFX allocation. An application of the rule does not decrease social welfare and decreases the size of the pool. b) If rule U 0 is not applicable then for any source i of G X and good g ∈ P , there will be an agent j = i such that v j (X i ∪ g) > v j (X j ). In particular, A X (X i ∪ g) will not be empty, and
Proof. The first part of a) follows directly from the precondition of the rule. The second part holds since the valuations are monotone and because |P | = |P | − 1. The first two sentences in part b) are obvious. We come to the third sentence. Since adding g to X i destroys the EFX-property, there must be some g ∈ X i ∪ g and some j ∈ [n] such that
Rule U 1 : Rule U 1 is applicable whenever there is an agent that values the pool higher than her current bundle (see Algorithm 2).
Lemma 6 (Rule U 1 ). Rule U 1 increases the social welfare and returns an EFX allocation.
Proof. Since there is an agent that values the pool higher than her own bundle, A X (P ) is nonempty. Choose i from A X (P ) arbitrarily. Let X be the allocation defined in Algorithm 2, line 7.
It remains to show that the allocation X is EFX, i.e., for every pair of agents j and k and any good g ∈ X k , we have v j (X k \ g) ≤ v j (X j ). Since X is EFX, this is obvious if neither j nor k is equal to i.
where Z is defined in Algorithm 2, line 6) by Lemma 4.
Rule U 2 : Rule U 2 is our most complex rule. It is applicable if for some ≥ 1, there are distinct goods g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g −1 in P , distinct sources s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s −1 of G X and distinct agents t 1 , t 2 ,. . . , t (indices are to be interpreted modulo ) such that for each i: (1) t i is a most envious agent when g i−1 is added to s i−1 and (2) t i is reachable from s i . We first show that rule U 2 is applicable if rule U 0 is not applicable and the pool contains at least n goods. 00 00 00 11 11 11 0 0 0 1 1 1 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 11 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 000 000 000 111 111 111
. j = 1 is largest such that t 3 ∈ C(s j ). The cycle is defined by s 1 , s 2 , g 1 , g 2 , t 2 and t 3 .
Lemma 7.
If |P | ≥ n and rule U 0 is not applicable then there is an ≥ 1, distinct goods g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g −1 in P , distinct sources s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s −1 of G X , and distinct agents t 1 , t 1 , . . . , t such that t i ∈ C(s i ) ∩ A X (X s i−1 ∪ g i−1 ) for i ∈ {0, . . . , − 1} (indices are modulo ).
Proof. Since rule U 0 is not applicable, A X (X s ∪ g) is non-empty for every source s of G X and every good g ∈ P . Construct a sequence of triples (s i , g i , t i+1 ), i ≥ 0 defined as follows. Let s 0 be an arbitrary source of G X and let g 0 be an arbitrary good in P . Assume we have defined s i−1 and g i−1 . Let t i ∈ A X (X s i−1 ∪ g i−1 ) be arbitrary. If t i ∈ C(s 0 ) ∪ · · · ∪ C(s i−1 ) then stop the construction of the sequence and let j be maximum such that t i ∈ C(s j ). Set = i − j and return s j , . . . , s i−1 , g j , . . . , g i−1 and t j+1 , . . . , t i ; see Figure 1 for an illustration. If t i ∈ C(s 0 ) ∪ · · · ∪ C(s i−1 ), let s i be such that t i ∈ C(s i ). Also, let g i be a good in P distinct from g 0 to g i−1 .
The construction is well-defined since |P | ≥ n and hence we cannot run out of goods. The sources and goods are pairwise distinct by construction. The agents t 1 to t i−1 are distinct by construction. The agent t i is distinct from t j+1 to
for k < i and j is maximum such that t i ∈ C(s j ).
for all k ∈ {0, . . . , m i − 1} and all i ∈ {0, . . . , − 1} and (ii) X t i = Z i−1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , }, where Z i is defined in Algorithm 2 (see line 12). For all other j, we have X j = X j .
Lemma 8 (Rule U 2 ). Rule U 2 increases social welfare and returns an EFX allocation.
Proof. We first observe that the valuations of the agents for their bundles have either increased or remained the same (since either the agents are left with their old bundles or assigned bundles that they envied). In particular, the valuations of all the agents in −1 i=0 m i k=0 {u i k } are strictly larger, where the vertices u i k are defined above. Thus φ(X ) > φ(X). It remains to show that the allocation X is EFX, i.e., for every pair of agents j and k and any good g ∈ X k we have v j (X k \ g) ≤ v j (X j ). Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t }. For every agent r / ∈ T we have X r = X r for some r . Now consider two cases depending k:
Note that valuations of the agents for their current bundles (in X ) is at least as good as their old bundles (in X). We have
We can now summarize. Let V = max i v i (M ) be the maximum valuation of any agent and let ∆ = min i min{|v i (T ) − v i (S)| : S, T ⊆ M and v i (S) = v i (T )} be the minimum difference between distinct valuations. Each application of rule U 1 or rule U 2 increases the social welfare by at least ∆ and hence there can be no more than nV /∆ applications of these rules. Each application of rule U 0 decreases the size of the pool by one and hence there cannot be more than m successive applications of this rule. We conclude that the number of iterations is at most nmV /∆. Thus we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 9. For normalized and monotone valuations, there is always an allocation X and a pool P of unallocated goods such that
• X is EFX,
for all agents i, and
• |P | is less than the number of sources in the envy-graph; in particular, |P | < n.
Algorithm 1 determines such an allocation in at most nmV /∆ iterations.
We also claimed in Section 1 that our algorithm gives another proof that when all the agents have identical (general) valuations then an EFX allocation with P = ∅ always exists. This proof is given in the appendix
Finding the Desired Allocation in Pseudo-Polynomial Time
In this section we describe how to find in time polynomial in n, m, V , and 1/∆, the EFXwith-bounded-charity allocation described in Theorem 9 for all gross substitute valuations. A minimum-size-valuable-set-oracle will be used here; it is defined as : given S ⊆ M , agent i, and α ∈ R such that v i (S) > α, find a minimum cardinality subset Z ⊆ S such that v i (Z) > α. 7 For additive valuations, the oracle is easy to realize. We initialize Z to the empty set and as long as v i (Z) ≤ α, we select g ∈ S \ Z with maximum v i (g) and add g to Z.
We now show that the oracle can also be realized for gross substitutes valuations. For the definition of the gross substitutes property, we use the notion of demand correspondence. D(v, p) ) Given a valuation function v : 2 M → R ≥0 and a price vector p ∈ R m ≥0 , define the demand correspondence as
Definition 10. (Demand Correspondence
That is, the demand correspondence is the family of sets that maximize the utility under prices p.
Definition 11. (Gross Substitutes (GS) [1] ) A valuation function v : 2 M → R ≥0 satisfies the gross substitutes (GS)
A useful consequence of the GS property [24] is that the greedy approach shown in Algorithm 3 computes a set S ∈ D(v, p). It considers goods in order of non-increasing incremental value of v(g|S) − p g where v(g|S) = v(S ∪ g) − v(S) and S is the current set. The algorithm is non-deterministic in the choice of g * in line 4 and whether to terminate in line 6.
Algorithm 3 Greedy Demand Oracle
If ∆ g * > 0 then set S = S ∪ g *
6:
If ∆ g * = 0 then either set S = S ∪ g * or return S
7:
If S = M or ∆ g * < 0 then return S If all prices are the same (equivalently, zero), the greedy approach (Algorithm 4) computes for each cardinality k, a set S k of maximum value (this is Z after k rounds of Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4 Most Valuable Sets
Let g * ∈ arg max g∈M \Z {v(g|Z)} 5:
. Let g k be the good added in the k-th round of Algorithm 4 and let
Then S k is a set of cardinality k of maximum value, i.e., v(S k ) ≥ v(T ) for every set T with |T | ≤ k.
by the submodularity 8 of v [22] . Thus S k is a most valuable set of size k. This is also true for k = m. So assume k < m and
where the first inequality holds since g k is chosen in round k and the second inequality follows from the submodularity of v. Let p be a price vector with p g = v(g k |S k−1 ) for all g ∈ M ; we abuse the notation and use also p for the common price. We will show that S k ∈ D(v, p).
Proof. We will use Algorithm 3 to derive that S k ∈ D(v, p). Observe that the price is the same (this is p) for all goods. So in each round, Algorithm 3 chooses a good g that maximizes v(g|S). This is also what Algorithm 4 does. We may assume that ties are broken in the same way and hence both algorithms add goods in the same order. We need to guarantee that Algorithm 3 can return the set S k . This holds because v(g k |S k−1 ) − p = 0, so we can add this item and terminate the algorithm in the next round where ∆ g k+1 ≤ 0.
We are now ready to show that v(T ) ≤ v(S) for any set T of size at most k. We have
for every set T ⊆ M since S k ∈ D(v, p). Hence we have:
for every set T with |T | ≤ k.
The minimum-size-valuable-set oracle is now readily realized. We simply run Algorithm 4 on the set S until a set of value greater α is obtained. We can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 14. For gross substitute valuations, the allocation defined in Theorem 9 can be determined with poly(n, m, V, 1/∆) value queries.
An FPTAS to Determine an "Almost" Desired Allocation. Our algorithm is pseudopolynomial, since the increase in individual valuations of the agents when we perform the update rules could be very small. Suppose we just wanted an "almost" EFX property, i.e., for every pair of agents i and j, we are happy to ensure that (1 + ε) · v i (X i ) ≥ v i (X j ) and also (1 + ε) · v i (X i ) ≥ v i (P ) for every i. Then we have an algorithm that runs in poly(n, m, 1 ε , log V ) time and finds a desired allocation.
Theorem 15. For normalized and gross substitute integral valuations, given any ε > 0, in time poly(n, m, 1 ε , log V ), we can determine an allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n and a pool of unallocated goods P such that
• for any pair of agents i and j we have
• for any agent i, we have (1 + ε) · v i (X i ) ≥ v i (P ), and
The proof follows in a straightforward manner from the proof of Theorem 9 in Section 2. The key idea is that the "almost" EFX property is violated if and only if ( 
. So every time we apply the update rules U 1 or U 2 there is a multiplicative improvement (by a factor of 1+ε) in the valuation of some agents. Since these valuations are upper-bounded by V we get a bound of poly(n, m, log (1+ε) V ) on the number of iterations.
Guarantees on Other Notions of Fairness
In this section we assume that all agents have additive valuations. We show that a minor variant of our algorithm finds an allocation with a good guarantee on Nash social welfare and groupwise maximin share (GMMS).
Guarantee in Terms of Nash Social Welfare. We claimed in Section 1 that for additive valuations, it can also be ensured that for each i, we have
. . , X * n is an optimal Nash social welfare allocation and X is the allocation in Theorem 9. This is easy to see from Algorithm 1: rather than initialize X i = ∅, we will initialize X i to the bundle corresponding to the allocation determined by the algorithm in [12] . So we have
, to begin with. As the algorithm progresses, our invariant is that v i (X i ) never decreases for any i. So if X = X 1 , . . . , X n is the final allocation computed by our algorithm, then we have
. Lemma 16. Given a set N of agents with additive valuations and a set M of goods, there exists an allocation X = X 1 , . . . , X n and a pool P of unallocated goods that satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 9 and v i (X i ) ≥ 1 2 v i (X * i ) for all i ∈ N , where X * = X * 1 , . . . , X * n is an optimal Nash social welfare allocation.
An Approximate MMS Allocation for Large |P |
We now show that if |P | (the number of unallocated goods in our allocation) is sufficiently large, then our EFX allocation X has a very good MMS guarantee. Recall that our algorithm continues till |P | is smaller than the number of sources in the envy-graph G X and recall that sources are unenvied agents. In particular, if |P | = n − 1, then the number of sources in G X is n; so no agent envies another. That is, for each i, we have
where for every agent i, the inequality MMS i (n, M ) ≤ v i (M )/n holds for additive valuations. We formalize the above intuition in Theorem 18. The following proposition will be useful. Theorem 18. Given a set N of n agents with additive valuations and a set M of m goods, there exists an allocation X = X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n and set P of unallocated goods that satisfies:
• the 3 conditions stated in Theorem 9;
where X * is an optimal Nash social welfare allocation;
n for every i ∈ N , where k = |P |. Proof. Let (X, P ) be the allocation guaranteed by Lemma 16. Hence the first two conditions given in the theorem statement are satisfied by (X, P ). So what we need to show now is that for any agent i, we have
Let N ⊆ N be the set of agents j for which either v i (X j ) ≤ v i (X i ) or |X j | ≥ 2. Then i ∈ N and all sources of G X belong to N . Also, |X j | = 1 and v i (X j ) > v i (X i ) for j ∈ N \ N . Let M be the set of goods allocated to the agents in N . The agents in N \ N are allocated the goods in M \ (M ∪ P ). Observe that every agent in N \ N is allocated at most one good. So we have |N \N | ≥ |M \(M ∪P )|. We know from Proposition 17 that
Since valuations are additive and
guarantee on GMMS. That is, we need to show that for everyÑ ⊆ N and all i ∈Ñ , we have 
Let j ∈ N \ {1, i}. Call Y j a bad bundle if |Y j | = 2 and and the goods in Y j will be called bad goods. Call all the remaining bundles good bundles and analogously, call the goods in these bundles good goods. We make some helpful observations below.
Proof. Since agent 1 was a source, we have
) for any g ∈ Y j . In particular, let g ∈ Y j be such that v i (g) is the least. Then we have :
Now we are ready to show the bound on GMMS. Let x be the number of bad goods in M . Then we have x/2 bad bundles and n − x/2 good bundles. We first assume x ≤ n . For any good bundle Y j we have:
when j = 1 (by Obs. 22),
otherwise (by Obs. 23).
Thus the total valuation agent i has for the good goods is at most We come to the case x > n . In that case we will prune M into M and N into N so that M has at most x ≤ n bad goods, n − x 2 many good bundles of Y where n = |N |, and MMS i (n , M ) ≤ MMS i (n , M ).
Let Z = Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . Z n be an optimal MMS partition for agent i on the set M of goods. Since there are more than n bad goods in M , there is a set Z k with at least two bad goods: let g 1 , g 2 ∈ Z k be a pair of bad goods. The following observation will be useful.
Observation 24. MMS i (n , M ) ≤ MMS i (n − 1, M \ {g 1 , g 2 }).
Proof. Distribute the goods in Z k \ {g 1 , g 2 } arbitrarily among the other sets in Z. So we have a partition of the set M \ {g 1 , g 2 } of goods into n − 1 many sets corresponding to agents in N \ {j} for some j ∈ N and j = i (note that we can choose any j ∈ N such that Y j is a bad bundle). The value of any set for agent i is at least MMS i (n , M ).
So let us update N to N \ {j} and M to M \ {g 1 , g 2 }. By Obs. 24, the MMS value for i does not decrease. We keep repeating this reduction until M has at most |N | bad goods. Since each step decreases |N | by 1 and the number of bad goods in |M | by 2, there will be a step when M has at most |N | bad goods.
We will now show that when all the agents have identical valuations and rule U 0 is not applicable, then the precondition of rule U 2 is satisfied as long as there is some unallocated good. Let X = X 1 , . . . , X n be the current allocation and let P = M \ ∪ n i=1 X i be the set of unallocated goods in X.
Lemma 25. Let s be any source vertex in the envy-graph G X . If |P | ≥ 1 and rule U 0 is not applicable then s ∈ A X (X s ∪ g) for any g ∈ P .
Proof. Let g ∈ P and s be any source in the envy-graph G X . Since rule U 0 is not applicable, A X (S) = ∅, where S = X s ∪ g. Let t ∈ A X (S). So v(X t ) < v(S), where v is the common valuation function of all agents. Let Z ⊆ S be the subset of size κ X (S) such that v(X t ) < v(Z). Since s is a source in G X , we have v(X s ) ≤ v(X t ). So v(X s ) < v(Z); thus κ X (s, S) ≤ κ X (S). Hence s ∈ A X (X s ∪ g).
Lemma 25 implies that while P = ∅, either rule U 0 or rule U 2 is applicable. Whenever we apply rule U 2 , we add any good g in P to the bundle of a source s in G X and determine Z ⊆ X s ∪ g of size κ X (X s ∪ g) such that v(Z) > v(X s ). We then throw the goods in (X s ∪ g) \ Z back into the pool P and set X s = Z. This makes agent s strictly better-off and no agent is worse-off: thus we have made progress. So when Algorithm 1 terminates, we have an EFX allocation with P = ∅. Thus we have a complete allocation X = X 1 , . . . , X n that is EFX.
